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NOTE

AMERICAN ANTITRUST POLICY IN AN
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT: A SURVEY OF
JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES
I. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS WITH REGAmD To ANTITRUST
The Supreme Court has declared that: "Antitrust laws in general
and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of economic freedom
and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection
of our fundamental personal freedoms."'
Significant questions arise, however, when the antitrust laws of
the United States are applied to conditions within the international
marketplace. As an expression of an economic ideal, debate exists as to
the objectives of antitrust enforcement in international trade. Within
the legal context, controversy surrounds the extraterritorial extension
of jurisdiction under the antitrust laws to reach persons and business
entities in foreign nations where particular business activities are not
regarded as illegal.
As a statement of economic policy, the Sherman Act is remarkably simple. Section 1 bars "[e]very contract, combination..., or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
1. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) (Marshall, J.); see
also Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) in which Justice Black
described the Sherman Act as a "comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at

preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade." Id. at 4.
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Further, section 2 makes it a crime for

any "person" to "monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of
the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations."' s The aim of the Sherman Act was simply to preserve the essential character of the free marketplace from the evils of monopoly and
plagued the nation through the latter half of
restraint of trade that had
4
the nineteenth century.
As a statement of law, however, the Sherman Act was devoid of
guidelines for the task of enforcement. Senator Sherman, in fact,
stated:
[i]t is difficult to define in legal language the precise line between lawful and unlawful combinations. This must be left to the courts to determine
All that we, as lawmakers, can do is to declare general principles, and . . . the courts will
....

apply them so as to carry out the meaning of the
law.3
In retrospect, it has been acknowledged that the passage of the
Sherman Act conferred upon the courts an exceptional and unprecedented authority to define and determine legitimate behavior in the
free marketplace.6 The amorphousness of the delegated authority explains, in part, the slow and uncertain invocation of the Sherman Act
in the enforcement process. Courts were not, however, wholly without
evidence as to the legislature's notion of the judiciary's role in deter2. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
3. Id.§2.
4. See generally J. TOWNSEND, EXTATaRRrrORmL AmTrTusT 29 (1980).
5. 21 CONG. REc. 2460 (1890), quoted in TOWNSEND, supra note 4, at 30.
6. In United States v. United Shoe. Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass.
1953), Judge Wyzanski wrote: "In the antitrust field the courts have been accorded, by
common consent, an authority they have in no other branch of enacted law." Id. at 348.
See also Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940) in which Justice Stone
explained:
The prohibitions of the Sherman Act were not stated in terms
of precision or of crystal clarity and the Act itself did not define them. Due to the vagueness of the language, perhaps not
uncalculated, the courts have been left to give content to the
statute, and in the performance of that function it is appropriate that courts should interpret its word in the light of its legislative history and of the particular evils at which the legislation was aimed.
Id. at 489.

19811

American Antitrust Policy

489

mining the limits of fair competition.7 Speaking on behalf of his bill
before Congress, Senator Sherman stated: "[The Sherman Act] defines
a civil remedy, and the courts will construe it liberally; they will presume the precise limits of the constitutional power of the government;
they will distinguish between lawful combinations in aid of production and unlawful combinations to prevent competition and in restraint of trade."
A fair reading of Sherman's words would seem clearly to indicate
that not all combinations were to be adjudged undesirable. Sherman
acknowledged the social utility and lawfulness of certain combinations.
The Senator's statement is important, however, because it stands in
marked contrast to what has become the prevailing judicial interpretation of the Sherman Act's mandate for free enterprise. Fifty-five years
later, in the landmark case of United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, Judge Learned Hand wrote: "We have been speaking only of
the economic reasons which forbid monopoly; but.., there are others,
based upon the belief that great industrial consolidations are inherently undesirable, regardless of their economic results . . .
There is a significant distinction between tolerating a combination or monopoly as an aid to production and promoting competition
for competition's sake. 10 Critics of the path that antitrust enforcement
has taken during the latter half of the twentieth century have pointed
to Senator Sherman's words of deference for "lawful combinations in
aid of production" to argue that "the only legitimate goal of our pre7. See 21 CONG. RBc. 2456 (1890); Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the
Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7 (1966).
8. 21 CONG. Rzc. 2456 (1890) (emphasis added). Senator Sherman went on to
state, "[t]his bill has for its single object to invoke the aid of the courts of the United
States to deal with the combinations described in the first section when they affect injuriously our foreign and interstate commerce... ." Id. He then explained that "[tjhe bill
does not in the least affect combinations in aid of production where there is free and fair
competition." Id. at 2457. See H. Tsolzuu, Tis FzDzaAL ANrrnuusT PoLIcY 180-87
(1965); Bork, supra note 7, at 7.
9. 148 F.2d 416, 428 (2d Cir. 1945) (emphasis added). See also United States v.
National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945) in which Judge Rifkind wrote: "Indeed, the major premise of the Sherman Act is that the suppression of competition in
international trade is in and of itself a public injury; or at any rate, that such suppression is a greater price than we want to pay for the benefits it sometimes secures." Id. at
525.
10. See United States v. National Lead Co., supra note 9. "The economic theory
underlying the Sherman Act is that, in the long run, competition is a more effective prod
to production and a more trustworthy regulator of prices than even an enlightened combination." Id. at 525. See also J. TowNswa, supra note 4, at 29, noting that the ideal of
competition "became an aim in itself."
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sent statutes is the maximization of consumer welfare."'" This appeal
to the overarching policy objectives of the antitrust statutes rejects, in
certain circumstances, the penalization of business arrangements that
merely result in a more efficient allocation of resources without posing
an actual threat to the marketplace."3
Accordingly, it has been recognized that many business actions
that have historically been treated as per se violations of our antitrust
laws," have been prosecuted for reasons that are irrelevant with regard
to the overarching antitrust concern of consumer welfare."
In the context of the global marketplace, questions concerning
the ultimate rationale of antitrust regulation take on an even greater
significance. The espousal of "competition for competition's sake"
seems, by itself, an insufficient guideline to be followed by American
courts for resolving the complexities of international trade.' s Attention
must be given to the possibility that the antitrust laws, which have
been developed in response to the restrictive practices of private business, do not properly account for a number of situations that can arise
within a global trade context. It should be noted that the trading rela11. Bork, Antitrust in Dubious Battle, Fortune, Sept. 1969, at 104; H. THoRsnL,
supra note 8, at 227. See also J. TowNsm., supra note 4, at 29. See generally Bork,
supra note 7.
12. See, eg., Bork, supra note 11, at 160.
13. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (Douglas,
J.), which has been cited in support of the premise that the per se rule in antitrust
actions applies to certain agreements or practices that, because of their pernicious effect
on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue, are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal. Cases decided pursuant to the Sherman Act have found
price fixing, market division, group boycotts, quota allocations, tying arrangements,
agreements to limit supply or to allocate customers, the division of fields of production
and the exclusion of competitors to be per se violations of that Act. See generally 1971
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 640. Where a per se antitrust violation is not readily apparent,
courts are to be guided by a "Rule of Reason" which calls into play established law as
well as the court's interpretation of public policy as embodied in the statute and as may
be applicable to the case before the court. Standard Oil of New Jersey v. United States,
221 U.S. 1 (1911). Inquiry following the "Rule of Reason" ends when a per se violation
has been found. J. TowNszND, supra note 4, at 40.
14. Bork, supra note 11, at 160.
15. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (1945) in
which Judge Learned Hand noted that:
it is quite true that we are not to read general words, such as
those in [the Sherman) Act, without regard to the limitations
customarily observed by nations upon the exercise of their
powers; limitations which generally correspond to those fixed
by the "Conflict of Laws." We should not impute to Congress
an intent to punish all whom its courts can catch, for conduct
which has no consequences within the United States.
Id. at 443.
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tionships that can arise between businesses within mixed-market or
state-controlled economies cannot be said to have been contemplated
by the framers of the antitrust laws."' Furthermore, the protection of
competition as an end in itself may prove inadequate in response to
those trade strategies of international businesses that place a higher
emphasis on the long-term penetration of markets17 or the immediate
accumulation of foreign exchange"8 than upon profit objectives that
would fit more easily within the traditional assumptions of acceptable
business behavior.
If the uncertainty concerning the ultimate policy objectives of extraterritorial antitrust enforcement is acknowledged to be substantial,
then the jurisdictional premises that support the extension of antitrust
regulation to conduct beyond our territorial boundaries are equally
open to question. 1' The experience of the courts demonstrates that antitrust laws are meaningful and enforceable only to the extent that
they adequately reflect the interest to be protected. 0
This is not to argue that our antitrust laws should have no extraterritorial dimension, but rather it is to suggest that the mechanical
application of antitrust shibboleths as guides to enforcement may be
inappropriate to the international arena. As noted above, the ideal of
"competition for competition's sake" might be too limiting an assumption for the conditions of international trade. Similarly, the judicial
16. To establish a Commission on the InternationalApplication of Antitrust
Laws: Hearings on S. 1010 Before the Comm. on Governmental Affairs United States
Senate, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. at 118-22 (1979-1980) (remarks of Mark R. Joelson, Chairman of the Committee on the International Aspects of Antitrust Law of the A.B.A. Section of International Law) [hereinafter cited as S.1010 Hearings].
17. The marketing strategies of the Japanese electronics industry, for example,
have relied on a state supported capital formation structure that utilizes debt-financing
at ratios of debt to equity-clearly unavailable to American competitors-which support
Japanese companies through several years of minimal profits in the hope of eventually
securing large shares of the American markets. Id. at 80. The minimal emphasis by
Japanese firms on short-term profits does not run afoul of the Antidumping Act of 1921
where the products are not sold at less than their home market value or their reasonably
constructed value. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-171 (1976). Nor does the Sherman Antitrust Act
protect a producer from predatory pricing where the competitor's prices do not fall below his own costs. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. 384, 400 (D. Del.
1978). While securing lower prices for domestic consumers the current policies behind
antitrust enforcement foster competition without reference to those structural inequalities of the global marketplace, thus placing American companies at a distinct tactical
disadvantage. See generally id.
18. See Outboard Marine Corp., supra note 17, which involved the sale, by the
Polish state, of low-priced golf carts in the United States.
19. For a discussion of jurisdictional issues, see notes 51-61 and Parts III & IV of
accompanying text infra.
20. Id.
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categorization of certain types of business conduct as per se violations
of the antitrust laws,2 without reference to the nature of the injury
and the interest to be protected, may amount to an insupportable interference with the international business process. Accordingly, parochial assumptions about the international marketplace should be identified and reassessed in light of the objectives that are to be served. 2

IL

STATUTORY AUTHORITY AND ENFORCEMENT AGENTS

American or foreign businesses that engage in international trade
which affects the commerce of the United States23 are potentially subject to a wide range of antitrust statutes. ' The Sherman Act, which
proscribes restraints of trade, monopoly and attempts at monopoly,2 '
does not specifically reach the problems posed by restraints on the import trade or actions that artificially increase the price of imports. In
response to these problems, Congress passed the Wilson Tariff Act in
1894." Following this legislation, Congressional attention focused on
unfair trade practices in the forms of price discrimination and price
fixing. This culminated in the enactment of the Clayton Act 2 7 and the
Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination amendments 2 to that Act in
1914. Further, within the same year, the Federal Trade Commission
Act2 s was passed, mandating the creation of an adjudicatory agency,
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which was charged with developing a unique competence in the prosecution of unfair trade practices
30
and methods.
An exception to the general thrust of America's antitrust legislation was embodied in the Webb-Pomerene Act 3" which exempts from
21. See supra note 13.
22. Prof. Myres McDougal summarizes the issue succintly: "In an interdependent world interference by states in each other's community processes, including economic affairs, is inescapable. The question is by what principles and procedures such
interference can be moderated and made reciprocally tolerable in the maintenance and
expansion of an international economy." INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF
THE FirY-FIRST CONFERENCE 304, 331 (1965).
23. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-14 (1976).
24. See notes 25-29 infra.
25. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
26. 15 U.S.C. §§ 8-11 (1976).
27. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 44 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
28. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13(a), 13(b), 21(a) (1976).
29. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
30. See Hastings Mfg. Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 153 F.2d 253, 258 (6th Cir.
1946).
31. 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1976).
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antitrust liability business combinations or associations formed for the
sole purpose of exporting goods abroad.3 2 The Webb-Pomerene Act is
one of the few antitrust statements that affirmatively encourages the
development of the export trade. Companies desirous of utilizing the
exemption must, however, comply with a number of extensive reporting requirements. It should also be noted that the Webb-Pomerene Act
further empowers the FTC to investigate those agreements and associations that the Commission believes to be responsible for artificially enhancing or depressing prices in the domestic market.3 3 Since
its passage in 1918, few companies have taken advantage of the WebbPomerene exemption and the legislation itself has been strongly criticized by antitrust enforcers for being in conflict with the basic philosophy of America's antitrust regulations." Hence, the future of the
Webb-Pomerene exemption is uncertain.
Two additional laws relating to antitrust and the conduct of international trade are section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930s and section
201 of the Trade Act of 1974.1' In a strict sense, these laws cannot be
regarded as antitrust statutes even though they empower the United
States International Trade Commission (ITC) to carry on investigations and issue sanctions, subject to approval by the President, against
unfair methods of competition in connection with the importation of
goods. While the role of the ITC may, to a certain extent, overlap with
the antitrust efforts of the FTC and the Justice Department, the mandate contained in these two acts is directed toward enforcement
against activities that have the "tendency" or "effect" of substantially
injuring a domestic industry.
The role of the Chief Executive in reviewing ITC actions invites
the politicization of foreign trade issues.3 7 In addition, the policy of
32. See supra note 25.
33. 15 U.S.C. § 65 (1976).
34. Speaking in his capacity as the Director of Policy Planning for the Antitrust
Division of the United States Department of Justice, Joel Davidow has noted that along
with a lack of enthusiasm for Webb-Pomerene's registry and reporting requirements,
"product differentiation is also an important reason for the ... Act's lack of use. American's generally do not want to sell if they do not have labels. They want to make their
own reputations." Lacey, Antitrust and Foreign Commerce: Reach and Grasp, 5 N.C.J.
INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 1, 21 (1980). Apart from its general lack of use, the Webb-Pomerene Act has been strongly criticized for theoretically allowing American firms to cartelize
their export trade thus making a farce of America's advocacy of strong international
antitrust rules. See REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES 295-306 (statement of the majority) (Jan. 22, 1979), 393-96 (separate view of Commissioner Javits).
35. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
36. 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1976).
37. See Applebaum, Are U.S. International Trade and Commerce Conduct
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protecting domestic industries expressed in the legislation is in potential conflict with the operative philosophy for the enforcement of antitrust laws, which is simply the protection of "competition." '
The possible sources of antitrust litigation facing international
businessmen are quite numerous. The Justice Department has historically been charged with the enforcement of the Sherman, Clayton, and
Webb-Pomerene Acts as well as relevant portions of the Wilson Tariff
Act. Antitrust actions through these statutes usually take the form of
civil suits, although the Justice Department is empowered to bring
criminal actions under the Sherman Act and through certain provisions
39
of the Clayton Act.
The FTC is specifically charged with the enforcement of the Federal Trade Commission Act, but may also move to enforce the Clayton,
Robinson Patman and Webb-Pomerene Acts.4
Finally, antitrust violations are subject to treble damage actions
by private parties seeking to vindicate claims pursuant to the Sherman, Clayton and Wilson Tariff Acts.4 1 Although, in theory, private
actions are a cornerstone of the antitrust enforcement policy, the
length and complexity of antitrust proceedings makes this remedy unavailable to many potential litigants, even with the incentive of a
treble damage award to spur litigation. 4' The suggestion that private
litigants further antitrust objectives by acting as enforcers is perhaps
something of a myth as section 5(a) of the Clayton Act provides that:
A final judgment or decree . . .rendered in any
Laws in Harmony with TraditionalAntitrust Law and Policy ?, 49
(1980).
38. See S.1010 Hearings, supra note 16, at 48.

ANTITRUST

L.J. 1207

39. See E. KINTNER, AN INTERNATIONAL ANTrrRusT PRIMER 19-20 (1974).
40. See E. KINTNER, A ROBINSON-PATMAN PRIMER 287 (1st ed. 1970), in which the
author, noting the question of overlapping enforcement authorities, writes:
[The FTC] normally enforces the provisions of the RobinsonPatman Act, unless the violation is part of a larger pattern of
illegality characterized by Sherman Act violations. For practices violative of both the Sherman Act and § 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act a number of factors are considered.
For example, if criminal proceedings are in order the division
(the Justice Department) naturally will be the agency of
enforcement.

Id.
41. The original antitrust treble damages provision is contained in Section 7 of
the Sherman Antitrust Act, Ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 210 (1890) (superseded by § 4 of the
Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976)). See E. KINTNER, supra note 39,
at 19-20.

42.
PENALTIES

See Applebaum, supra note 37; K.
68 (1976).

ELZINGA

& W. BRrr,

THE ANTITRUST
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proceeding civil or criminal proceeding brought
by... the United States under the antitrust laws
to the effect that the defendant has violated such
laws shall be prima facie evidence against such
defendant in any action.., brought by any other

party .

...

48

Thus, with the successful conclusion of a federal antitrust action,
private litigants may take advantage of the outcome." The role of private litigants as enforcers of antitrust policy is thus open to question.
The added weight of liability, however, undoubtedly serves as a major
deterrent."

III.

INTERNATIONAL APPLICATION

One of the more controversial developments concerning the role
of America's antitrust laws in the international arena has been the recognition, by the Supreme Court, of the right of foreign sovereigns to
bring their own treble damage actions in the United States courts. 46 In
Pfizer Inc. v. India,'47 the governments of Iran and India invoked section 4 of the Clayton Act against an American drug manufacturer for
fixing prices and dividing markets. The Court, by recognizing those
sovereigns to be "persons" for the purpose of suit within the Clayton
Act," raised a significant question concerning the disparity between
the substantially broadened remedies now available to foreign sovereigns and the comparatively limited opportunites for American litigants to obtain redress in foreign forums." Arguably, the decision in
Pfizer affords greater rights to foreign sovereigns in commercial suits
than American plaintiffs would possess. 0
The Antitrust Division of the Justice Department has supported
the right of foreign sovereigns to invoke America's antitrust remedies.5 1
Congress, however, has reacted by debating legislation that would pre43. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
44. See K. ELZINGA & W. B-rmr, supra note 42.
45. Id.
46. Pfizer Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
47. Id.
48. 15 U.S.C. §12(a) (1976).
49. 434 U.S. at 319.
50. See S.1010 Hearings, supra note 16, at 72, 90 (statement of William F.
Kennedy).
51. Davidow, U.S. Antitrust, Free Trade, and Non-Market Economies, 12 J.
WORLD TRADE L. 473 (1978).
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condition the right of foreign sovereigns to bring suit in United States
courts on the availability of reciprocal laws5 and remedies for American
litigants in the foreign sovereign's courts. 2
Within the context of international trade, the multiple enforcement of the antitrust laws has been criticized as being "ill suited to the
needs of the United States to speak with a unified voice in matters
that importantly affect our international commercial relations" s especially where the interests of international trade overlap with the concerns of United States foreign policy. Certainly these are concerns that
the courts cannot avoid as has been evidenced by the resolution of a
number of cases according to the principles of comity or the act of
state doctrine.6 4 The abstention by courts in this area, however, points
up the need for more explicit statements of policy, so that judicially
manageable standards can be applied in the prosecution of antitrust
violations.

IV.
A.

A

SURVEY OF JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES

The Jurisdictional Requirements Of Antitrust Enforcement

In applying America's antitrust laws 58 to restraints of trade or
monopolies involving "commerce . . . with foreign nations," the courts
have been pressed to develop a theory of jurisdiction that comports
with the nation's economic and political interest in competition and
open markets. 56 . One scholar has noted that, "to find jurisdiction, it was
52. See S. 2395, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); S. 2486, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978);
S. 2724, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
53. S.1010 Hearings, supra note 16, at 160 (remarks of Gary Hufbauer).
54. See Parts IVB and IVC infra.
55. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (Sherman Act); §§ 12 and 14 (Clayton Act); §
13(a) (Robinson-Patman Act) and §§ 61-65 (Webb-Pomerene Act)(1976).
56. The debate on extraterritorial jurisdictional premises can produce widely divergent results. Compare Kintner & Griffin, JurisdictionOver Foreign Commerce Under
the Sherman Antitrust Act, 18 B.C. INDUS. & COM. REv. 199 (1977) (in which the authors observe that antitrust laws mandating the protection of foreign commerce pursuant
to U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, compel courts to examine the connection, if any, between the
alleged restraint and the commerce affected, then balance the reasonableness of the restraint, if any, against the burdensome effects such a restraint places on commerce) with
Rahl, Foreign Commerce Jurisdictionof the American Antitrust Laws, 43 A.B.A. AN'ITRUST L.J. 521 (1974). Professor Rahl asserts that the taking of jurisdiction is proper
when a restraint or monopolization occurs either (1) "in the course of foreign commerce,
or (2) if it substantially affects either foreign or interstate commerce." Id. at 523. He
explains:
[Tihere need be [shown] no effect at all if the complaint oc-
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necessary [for the courts] to replace the strictly territorial principle of
international law with the protective principle."'5 " The protective principle of jurisdiction requires that courts identify injuries to national
economic processes that are, in fact, capable of being protected
through the principles of free trade and competition." The trend toward protective jurisdictional principles is illustrated in the progression of cases following the Supreme Court's 1909 ruling in American
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co."
In American Banana, the defendant, the United Fruit Company,
conspired in this country with the Costa Rican government to effect a
seizure of territory in Panama in which the American Banana Company's plantation was located. The actions of United Fruit deprived
the plaintiff of the use of its property and injured its business, thus
causing American Banana to bring a suit charging that United Fruit
had violated the Sherman Act. Justice Holmes, writing for the Supreme Court, treated the complaint as a suit for the vindication of private rights arising from injury to the defendant.6 0 So framed, American
Banana's rights in Panama and Costa Rica were found to be dependent
on the actions of the Panamanian and Costa Rican governments, the
lawfulness or unlawfulness of which were not subject to review by
American courts." Thus, even though United Fruit unlawfully sought

curs as part of a transaction which itself takes place in export
or import trade ....
The finding of "effect" becomes important only when the restraint is in transactions which occur
before, or after, the relevant movement of commerce, or are
tangential to it.
Id.
57. J. TOWNSEND, supra note 4, at 41.
58. Id.
59. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
60. Although the brief for American Banana alleged that the "commerce of the
United States may by its statutes be protected from injury by acts done beyond its
boundaries," id. at 351, the Court's opinion focused solely on the question of recognition
by United States courts of a cause of action arising from an injury received in the extraterritorial context. Nowhere in the decision does the Court consider the possibility that
injury to the commerce of the United States could form the requisite jurisdictional predicate. Id.
61. See Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897). Chief Justice Fuller's formulation of the act of state doctrine states:
Every sovereign [s]tate is bound to respect the independence
of every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country
will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by
reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open
to be availed by sovereign powers as between themselves.
Id. at 252.
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to persuade the Costa Rican government to interfere in a competitor's
affairs, it was held that the foreign sovereign's fundamental power to
select a course that it "declares by its conduct to be desirable and
proper.., makes [United Fruit's] persuasion lawful by its own act.""
In conclusion, the Court held that "[a] conspiracy in this country to do
acts and make
acts in another jurisdiction does not draw to itself those
6' 3
them unlawful, if they are permitted by local law."
The significance of the territorial principle of jurisdiction, enunciated in American Banana, was eroded in subsequent cases" largely because of the Supreme Court's adoption of a "jurisdictional Rule of
Reason" 6 as a general approach to the adjudication of antitrust cases.
This theory of jurisdiction for antitrust enforcement was tied, ultimately, to the Court's interpretation of the term "restraint of trade"
and, accordingly, the content of those words could be understood only
in terms of the interest to be protected."
In United States v. American Tobacco Co.," a complex set of
agreements and property transactions between an American company
and its British competitor led to a division of the world's tobacco markets between them. The arrangements were subsequently challenged
by the Government as an illegal restraint of trade. The prosecutors argued, initially, that the term "restraint of trade," as applied to American Tobacco required a literal interpretation of the letter of the Sherman Act so as to encompass every agreement, reasonable or not, that
was made for the purpose of ending a prior trade war between the two
competitors.6 8 That narrow line of argument, which called for a literal
reading of the Act, required, by implication, that the Court exclude
from consideration certain business transactions involving mere
purchases of property which, although vital to the Government's case,
62. 213 U.S. at 358.
63. Id. at 359.

64. Kingman Brewster has noted that:
although the Banana case is consistent with the long tradition
of territorial limitation as a general proposition, it might be
distinguished from a situation where effects on United States

commerce or trade or commerce with foreign nations were allegedly brought about by private acts abroad. It clearly can be
and has been distinguished from cases where foreign conduct
was part and parcel of a scheme of restraints some of which
took place in the United States.
K. BREwSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BusiNEss ABROAD 68 (1958).
65. See generally Standard Oil of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1
(1911).
66. See Bork, supra note 11, at 160.
67. 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
68. Id. at 177.
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could not literally be regarded as agreements or combinations in
restaint of trade."
To remedy this deficiency, the Government further argued that
the Act must be interpreted, not only according to its letter, but according to its spirit or intent so as to reach even those transactions not
covered by the letter of the Act.71 Through that interpretation, even
the most innocent conduct could be found suspect."
The Court noted the contradiction in the arguments and took the
occasion to elaborate upon the rule that it had handed down only two
weeks earlier in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States:79
"The [Sherman Act] must have a reasonable construction, or else there would scarcely be an
agreement or contract among business men that
could not be said to have, indirectly or remotely,
some bearing on interstate commerce, and possibly to restrain it.". . . [T]he Anti-trust Act only
embraced acts or contracts or agreements or combinations which operated to the prejudice of the
public interests by unduly restricting competition
or unduly obstructing the due course of trade or
which, either because of their inherent nature or
effect or because of the evident purpose of the
acts, etc., injuriously restrained trade, ... 7
The Court then emphasized that,
[T]he duty to interpret which inevitably arose
from the general character of the term restraint of
trade required that the words restraint of trade
should be given a meaning which would not destroy the individual right to contract and render
difficult if not impossible any movement of trade
. . . the free movement of which
it was the pur7
pose of the statute to protect. '
In reaching its decision to remand the case, the Court was unwilling to consider the question of granting immunity to a conspiracy in69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See id. at 179.
72. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
73. 221 U.S. at 179 (quoting United States v. Joint Traffic Association 171 U.S.
505, 568 (1898))(emphasis added).
74. Id. at 180.
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volving an American company merely because of the involvement of
foreign parties.75 Questions pertaining to the technical issues of territorial jurisdiction were evidently subsumed in the Court's perception of
the construction that was required by the term "restraint of trade" in
light of the objectives of the antitrust laws.
7
Three years later, in United States v. Pacific & Arctic Railway, 6
a case involving the attempted monopolization of rail and ship traffic
between the ports of the United States and Alaska, the Supreme Court
rejected the contention that the passage of foreign routes through Canada placed the challanged restraints outside the jurisdiction of the
United States. 77 In a famous passage, the Supreme Court explained:
This is but saying that the laws have no extraterritorial operation; but to apply the proposition
as defendants apply it would put the transportation route. .. out of the control of either Canada

or the United States. These consequences we cannot accept .

. .

. [The conspiracy] was a control

to be exercised over transportation in the United
States, and, so far, is within the jurisdiction of the
laws of the United States, criminal and civil. If we
may not control foreign citizens or corporations
operating in foreign territory, we certainly may
control such citizens and corporations operating
in our territory, as we undoubtedly may control
our own citizens and our own corporations.78
With the decision in Pacific & Arctic Railway, the possibility of
immunity based simply upon the happenstance of extraterritoriality
was discarded as untenable when viewed in light of the United States'
interest in its economic underpinnings and the movement among nations toward extensive economic and commercial interdependence.
While the extraterritorial circumstances of some of the parties to
an action no longer provided a guarantee of immunity, the Court nevertheless continued, in several later cases, to predicate its exercise of
jurisdiction upon the emblematic presence of either the parties or7 their
conspiratorial actions within the territory of the United States. 9
75.
76.

K. BRawsgaR, supra note 64, at 68; J. ToWNSEND, supra note 4, at 44.
228 U.S. 87 (1913).

77. Id. at 106.
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., Thomson v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917); United States v. Sisal Sales
Corp., 274 U.S. 263 (1928). The Supreme Court, in Thomson, rejected the argument that
the legality of transatlantic shipping combinations under foreign law could immunize the
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The contemporary theoretical basis for the prosecution of extraterritorial antitrust cases was formulated some thirty-two years after
Pacific & Arctic Railway with Judge Learned Hand's decision in
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America."°
In Alcoa, it was charged that the Alcoa company, along with several foreign corporations, formed a Swiss company to buy pre-allocated
ingot production between the several firms at fixed prices.'1 Although
Alcoa was determined not to have been a party to the cartel, Judge
Hand found that the foreign companies had in fact entered into an
arrangement intending to restrict foreign production and thereby affect the import trade to America. 8 ' In his analysis of the Court's powers of jurisdiction over the foreign defendants, Judge Hand applied the
principle of objective territoriality and stated:
[I]t is quite true that we are not to read general
words, such as those in this Act, without regard to
the limitations customarily observed by nations
upon the exercise of their powers; limitations
which generally correspond to those fixed by the
"Conflict of Laws." We should not impute to Congress an intent to punish all whom its courts can
catch, for conduct which has no consequences
within the United States. On the other hand, it is
settled law.., that any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance,
for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its borders which the state reprehends; and these liabilities other states will ordinarily recognize.'
Learned Hand's sweeping extension of the Sherman Act's legisladefendants from domestic antitrust laws. The Court noted, however, that the defendants
maintained agents in this country who were participants in the scheme and found that
"the combination affected the foreign commerce of this country and was put into operation here." 243 U.S. at 88. In Sisal, the American defendants set up a Mexican subsidiary and then procured legislation from the Mexican government to grant their subsidiary
a monopoly on the sisal fiber trade. In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court did not
consider the affirmative acts on the part of the Mexican government a bar to jurisdiction.
The Court stated: "True, the conspirators were aided by discriminating legislation, but
by their own deliberate acts, here and elswehere, they brought about forbidden results
within the United States. They are within the jurisdiction of our courts and may be
punished for offenses against our laws." 274 U.S. at 276.
80. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
81. Id. at 432.
82. Id. at 443-44.
83. Id. at 443.
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tive jurisdiction to reach the conduct of foreign parties, merely on the
basis of the effects of their conduct within this country, reduced to a
nullity the jurisdictional principle once asserted in American Banana
that "all legislation is prima facie territorial."" Although Judge
Hand's analysis of jurisdiction had drawn from the text of the Restatement of the Conflict of Laws" and had found support by way of analogy from the established practices between states in the areas of criminal law and tort law," the propriety of his application of those
principles to the antitrust field has been vigorously questioned. 87 The
effects of economic crimes have been argued to be too remote and too
speculative to serve as an adequate basis for jurisdiction." In addition,
the contrasting views in the international arena as to what might
amount to an economic crime afford little or no international consensus for sanctioning such an application of the principle of objective
territoriality.89
The arguments, however, in support of Learned Hand's analysis
of the effects principle of jurisdiction cannot be easily dismissed, unless the threat of genuine injury to our economic system from extralegal coercive activity is regarded as illusory. In fact, evidence exists to
suggest that the framers of the Sherman Act envisaged its application
to foreign parties precisely for the reason that their activities could
work to the injury of the economic system without the parties themselves ever subjecting themselves to the territorial jurisdiction of
American courts." The argument continues to carry great force, and
84. 213 U.S. at 357.
85. 148 F.2d at 443; RzSATEm:ET

or CoNIcT OF LAWS § 65 (1934) states "if
consequences of an act done in one state occur in another state each state in which any
event in the series of acts and consequences occurs may exercise legislative jurisdiction

to create rights or other interests as a result thereof." Id.
86. See K. BREwsTMza supra note 64, at 73; J. TOWNSEND, supra note 4, at 58;
Griffin, American Antitrust Law and Foreign Governments, 13 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 138

(1978).
87. Kingman Brewster notes that, except with respect to conduct commonly accepted by nations as being criminal, the territoriality principle of jurisdiction can be

considered to be a settled presumption which recognizes no exceptions for matters of
economic policy on which nations will differ. K. BRwWSR, supra note 64, at 73. See also
J. TOWNSEND, supra note 4, at 58, where the author points out that as between nations,
"the principle underlying the imposition of liabilities is usually regarded as applicable
only to crimes that all civilized nations condemn, such as piracy, but not the economic

crime of antitrust."
88. See Kintner & Griffin, supra note 56, at 223.

89. Id.
90. Senator James Z. George, in his remarks on an earlier version of the bill,
which apparently did not cover agreements or restraints entered outside the jurisdiction

of the United States, stated
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advocates of the effects holding in Alcoa have pointed out that the
very absence of an international enforcement mechanism and the importance of the regulations, justify the application of domestic antitrust statutes.' 1 In addition, scholars have observed that the notion of
effects jurisdiction already finds recognition in international case law
and, therefore, cannot be interpreted as a departure from the customary expectations of nations in the international legal system."
The debate over the validity of the effects rationale of extraterritorial jurisdiction has preoccupied many legal scholars."*But, with the
increased enforcement of antitrust policies," and the absorption of the
The first thing which attracts our attention, therefore, is that
if the agreement or combination, which is the crime, be made
outside of the jurisdiction of the United States it is also without the terms of the law and cannot be punished in the United
States... Then, if these conspirators are foreigners and remain at home ...and there make the combination or agreement they escape the criminal part of this law... The raising
of prices and the prevention of free and full competition may
all take place in the United States, and yet no crime has been
committed.
That this is serious and not a mere fanciful and hypothetical objection is manifest; for it is certain that if the bill
becomes a law all combinations and agreements involving
large amounts and therefore seriously affecting the welfare of
the people of the United States will be outside of the jurisdiction of theUnited States. Canada and Mexico are near neighbors, and the former will certainly become the locality in
which these agreements will be made, as it has become the
refuge of embezzlers at this day ....
21 CONG. Rsc. 1766 (1890), quoted in Kintner & Griffin, supra note 56, at 201-02; see
also note 98 and accompanying text infra.
91. See Kintner & Griffin, supra note 56.
92. See The S.S. Lotus, [19271 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10.
It is certain that the courts of many countries, ... interpret
criminal law in the sense that offenses, the authors of which at
the moment of commission are in the territory of another
state, are nevertheless to be regarded as having been committed in the national territory, if... especially its effects have
taken place there ....
Id. at 23 (emphasis added), noted in Kintner & Griffin, supra note 56, at 223
n.139. See also Comment, Sherman Act Litigation: A Modern Objective TerritorialJurisdictionand the Act of State Doctrine, 84 DicK. L. Rsv.645, 649-50 n.41 (1980). See
also the discussion of Commerce and the Antitrust Law 25-29 (1958); Address by John
Shenefield presented to the A.B.A Section of International Law, August 9, 1978, reprinted in [1979] 5 TRADz Rao. Rap. (CCH) 1 50,386, at 55,837.
93. See, e.g., J. TowNsaND, supra note 4, at 61-2.
94. See U.S. DEp'T OF Jusecs, ArrrnusT DIvsoN, Amwmus¢! Gume mom rATsMEN? OF PROFESSOR JAMES RAHL, S. 1010 Hearings, supra note 16.
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doctrine into our legal system" this debate has, over the course of
time, been rendered moot. In addition, it can be noted that several
foreign nations have also applied their antitrust laws extraterritorially
in what appears to be but a part of a more general international movement toward the enactment of global rules to promote non-restrictive
business practices."6
Hence, the focus of attention has shifted from the basic premises
of extraterritorial jurisdiction, to the development of an adequate judicial characterization of circumstances to guide in the rational application of effects jurisdiction. In Alcoa, Learned Hand attempted to limit
the otherwise innumerable situations in which effects jurisdiction
might be asserted. He wrote:
Two situations are possible. There may be agreements beyond our borders not intended to affect
our imports, which do affect them, or which affect
exports. Almost any limitation of the supply of
goods in Europe for example, or in South
America, may have repercussions in the United
States if there is trade between the two. Yet when
one considers the international complications
likely to arise from an effort in this country to
treat such agreements as unlawful, it is safe to assume that Congress certainly did not intend the
Act to cover them. That situation might be
thought to fall within the doctrine that intent
may be a substitute for performance in the case of
95. See, eg., REsTATEMENT (SzcoND) OF THin FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF TH
UNIrD STATES § 18 (1965):
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching
legal consequences to conduct that occurs outside its territory
and causes an effect within its territory if either (a) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as constituent elements of a crime... or (b)(i) if the conduct and its effect are
constituent elements of activity to which the rule applies; (ii)
the effect within the territory is substantial; (iii) it occurs as a
direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the territory;, and (iv) the rule is not inconsistent with the principles of
justice generally recognized by states that have reasonably developed legal systems.
Compare id. with The S.S. Lotus, supra note 92.
96. See European Economic Community Treaty, Apr. 18,. 1951, art. 85, 261
U.N.T.S. 140 and the discussion of that article found in B. HAWK, 2 UNITED STATES,
COMMON MARKrr AND INTzRNATIONAL ANTRusi. A CoMPARATIVE Gums at 455-59
(1979). See also J. TOwNSEND, supra note 4, at 61-62.
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a contract made within the United States; or it
might be thought to fall within the doctrine that
a statute should not be interpreted to cover acts
abroad which have no consequences here. We
shall not choose between these alternatives; but
where both conditions are satisfied, the situation
certainly falls within such decisions."9
Judge Hand found that the foreign corporations charged in Alcoa
had signed an agreement, the intent of which was to allocate quotas for
the importation to America of aluminum ingots. Accordingly, an intent
to restrain trade with the United States could be presumed. Judge
Hand then explained that with the presumption of intent established,
the burden of proof had shifted to the defendants to demonstrate that
their actions did not affect domestic commerce.9 8 Thus, the establishment of the intent element, pursuant to Judge Hand's jurisdictional
equation in Alcoa, created a virtually insurmountable presumption
that the activity at issue had affected the commerce of the United
States.
Closely following Alcoa was the decision handed down by Judge
Rifkind in United States v. National Lead Co." which was a case involving cross licensing agreements between three competitors for the
production of titanium. Each party to the various agreements was assigned the exclusive distribution rights within a particular territory for
the titanium compounds produced by its competitors through their various patented processes.'" The United States Government charged
and proved that a conspiracy had been entered into in the United
States to restrain and control the world's trade in titanium.'10
Judge Rifkind's opinion in National Lead elaborated further
upon the extraterritorial powers of the court.'" Initially, it was noted
that any "combination of competitors, which by agreement divides the
world into exclusive trade areas, and suppresses all competition among
the members of the combination, offends the Sherman Act." Having
found the division of world markets, with its subsequent effect on domestic commerce to be illegal per se, the court reviewed the adequacy
of the defenses raised by the defendant.0' The court then turned to
97. 148 F.2d at 443-44.
98. Id. at 444-45.

99. 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945).
100. Id. at 518.
101.
102.

Id. at 524.
Id. at 523.

103. Id.
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the argument raised by the foreign party defendants that the court had
no power to invalidate the contracts of parties not subject to the
court's jurisdiction.1z ' Rifkind answered by noting that although the
absence from the court of the foreign defendants would
place a practical limitation upon the scope of the
court's decree; it does not prevent the court from
finding a violation as the facts warrant, and from
restraining those within the reach of its mandate
from continuing a conspiracy in defiance of the
Sherman Act.
Were the rule . . . [that this court cannot
invalidate contracts with parties who are not
within the court's jurisdiction] allowed to operate
in the field of restaint upon the foreign commerce
of the United States, it would paralyze the enforcement of the law in all cases where one or
more of the parties to the conspiracy was an alien
corporation over whom the court could acquire no
personal jurisdiction. The courts do not so readily
permit a frustration of valid national policy.'"
Judge Rifkind's analysis made it clear that the power of a court's personal jurisdiction over foreign parties was, at best, a relatively minor
impediment to the court's furtherance of antitrust objectives."" The
judiciary's power to determine the subject matter of the Sherman Act
ensured that the court could exert a significant amount of leverage
over foreign defendants whether or not they chose to submit to personal jurisdiction.'" The decision of a foreign defendant to avoid the
jurisdiction of the American courts in domestic antitrust actions is
thus tantamount to a decision to forego all participation in the American marketplace. It seems apparent that many foreign corporations
perceive exclusion from the American marketplace to be a greater
hardship than antitrust enforcement.' °"
104. Id. at 525.
105. Id.
106. The determination of personal jurisdiction over foreign party defendants
follows the Supreme Court's test of "sufficient minimum contacts" between the forum
state and the defendant party first stated in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310 (1945); See Davidow, U.S. Antitrust and DoingBusiness Abroad, 5 N.C.J. IN'L
L & CoM. Ran. 23,27 (1980).
107. Id.
10& Joel Davidow, the then Director of Policy Planning for the Antitrust Divi-

1981]

American Antitrust Policy

The foreign defendants in National Lead also argued that the
court must apply a "Rule of Reason" in considering their conduct.-"
Pointing out that no injury from their conduct had been shown and
that, in fact, the arrangement under attack had resulted in increased
production and low prices which benefited the public.11 Judge Rifkind
responded by rejecting any arguments that would have placed the
court in a position of determining the social utility of particular instances of anticompetitive conduct, and declared that the interpretive
powers of the courts were limited to carrying out the purpose of the
Sherman Act. He wrote that: "[T]he major premise of the Sherman
Act is that the suppression of competition in international trade is in
and of itself a public injury; or at any rate, that such suppression is a
greater price than we want to pay for the benefits it sometimes
secures."I
Faced with the contention that American business could not
avoid entering into cooperative arrangements and still compete in a
"cartelized" world, Rifkind noted that any reconsideration of the mandate of the Sherman Act must be left to Congress.
[Congressional inquiry] is appropriate to the evaluation of the merits of the proposition. For the
sion of the Department of Justice has written:
[T]his theory of substantive jurisdiction based on the effects
of a business practice can usually be utilized effectively only in
a case where personal jurisdiction is available against the relevant parties. However ... [tihere have been cases in which a
foreign company was indicted and stayed out of the United
States for a number of years, but then voluntarily agreed to
pay a fine and settle the lawsuit because executives of the
company wanted to be free to do business or travel in the
United States without the risk of an arrest based on pending
charges.
Davidow, U.S. Antitrust, Free Trade, and Non-Market Economics, 12 J. Woma TPiunz
L 473, 475 (1978). In another article Davidow stated:
The Department of Justice has stated its willingness, where
appropriate, to seek indictment even of an absent defendant
against whom personal jurisdiction is not available. This is
done to force the culprit to answer the antitrust charge or refrain from entering the United States for business or other
purposes while the indictment pends - possibly indefinitely.
Davidow, supra note 106, at 27. Such enforcement strategies suggest that those foreign
companies in positions of economic power that are capable of mounting a threat to
America's commerce, are also those companies which have the most to lose if excluded
from participation in the American market.
109. See supra note 13.
110. 63 F. Supp. at 525.
111. Id. See also supra notes 9 and 10.
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courts it is conclusive that Congress has not yet
validated such a solution to the problem. Until it
does, private agreement and combination and private regulation may not substitute for legislation.
Only Congress, not the courts, may grant the required immunity.112
Acknowledging the responsiblities of the courts in the enforcement of antitrust matters, the question persists as to whether Judge
Rifkind's refusal to consider the social utility of the defendant's conduct is consistent with either the Sherman Act's mandate or the rationale behind the judiciary's unique role in defending that mandate. As
has already been noted, the guidelines for judicial enforcement of the
Sherman Act were vague,11 3 but implicit in the vagueness of the statute
is the intent that the courts provide a flexible approach in giving content to antitrust policies and enforcement.' The role of the courts in
antitrust enforcement may be compared with an administrative
agency. The courts are charged not merely with the adjudication of
cases and controversies, but also with the formulation of the principles
of antitrust policy itself."O In light of the policy-oriented role of the
courts, Judge Rifkind's demarcation of the court's mandate in the interpretation of antitrust principles seems an ill-founded and unnecessary barrier to the consideration of the merits of a particular defense.
Such a limitation undermines the flexibility of judicial review in an
area of law that requires a periodic reexamination of the policy objectives at stake.

B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A JURISDICTIONAL RULE OF
REASON

Since the decisions handed down in Alcoa ' and National
Lead," 7 both the courts and respective enforcement agencies have
struggled to refine policy guidelines for the assertion of extraterritorial
63 F. Supp. at 526.
See supra notes 2-22 and accompanying text.
114. See R. BORK, THz ANirrRusT PARADox (1978). "Antitrust is . . . a set of
continually evolving theories about the economics of industrial organization [and] ... the
112.
113.

general movement has been away from legislative decision by Congress and toward political choice by courts." Id. at 10. See generally, J.
115. See supra text accompanying note 5.

116. See supra note 80.
117. See supra note 99.

TOWNSEND,

supra note 4, at 30-33.
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jurisdiction based on the principle of objective territoriality.116
The Alcoa jurisdictional test which consisted of a showing of both
the intent to affect commerce and a showing of effects upon America's
domestic or foreign commerce,11 ' in fact, provided more favorable
treatment to foreign parties than to domestic defendants who could
not challenge subject-matter jurisdiction where their actions were
found merely to have affected commerce.12 0 Later decisions restated
the jurisdictional test in a disjunctive form to require a showing of either the "intent to affect" or "actual effects" on America's commerce.121 Another formulation was proferred by the Justice Department, which declared as its jurisdictional test the requirement that the
challenged conduct have a "substantial and foreseeable effect on U.S.
commerce."1' ' The Justice Department's Antitrust Guide for International Operations indicates that the underlying consideration in the assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction has to do with the sufficiency of
the impact on United States commerce.118 Subsequent cases have held
that the sufficiency of an effects- or impact-based jurisdictional predicate must be measured against a variety of competing interests, against
118. See supra text accompanying note 83.
119. See supra text accompanying note 97.
120. Id. See also Rutledge, Sherman Act Litigation: A Modern Generic Approach To Objective Territorial Jurisdictionand the Act of State Doctrine, 84 DicK. L
Rzv. 645, 652 (1980).
121. See United States v. Imperial Chemical Indus., 100 F. Supp. 504, 557
(S.D.N.Y. 1951); see generally Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d
597, 611 (9th Cir. 1977) (reviewing the many jurisdictional tests); see also RwTzuimT
(SacoNm) or FOREGN RAnONS LAw or Tm UNImD STATES § 18, Comment f (1965)

(noting that intent may be presumed where "those responsible for the conduct had reason to foresee that the effect within the territory would result from the conduct
outside."); see also supra note 95; but see note 122 infra.
122. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Division, Antitrust Guide for International
Operations 6 (1977). But see Davidow, supra note 106.
A question regarding the selection of defendants in a foreign
case is the defendant's mens rea. For purpose of fairness and
equity, we [the Justice Dep't] have taken the view when indicting individual for a criminal offense, that there should be
some reason to believe that he knew he was violating the antitrust law. Conceivably.... [an] American might be held to a
higher standard of knowledge than the foreigner.
Id. at 35.
123. Antitrust Guide, supra note 122. In at least one case involving a private
party's action to enjoin a major foreign firm's exports to the United States based on an
injury to that plaintiff, the Justice Department entered the appeal process as amicus
curiae to argue that it was bad public policy to allow disruption of a major industry
based on an injury to the interests of a single U.S. firm. See Calnetics v. Volkswagen of
America, 532 F.2d 674, 693 (9th Cir. 1976) discussed in Davidow, supra note 108. at 47&
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1
which the courts must further weigh the assertion of jurisdiction." '
Challenges to jurisdiction based on a competing interests mode of analysis have proven more fruitful than defenses which require judicial
clarification or resolution of the ultimate policy objectives of antitrust
enforcement.125
In Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America,' Timberlane
charged that the Bank of America and others had conspired to drive
that company out of Honduras by persuading the Honduran government to enforce security interests that were being held against
Timberlane's milling operations."27 The district court dismissed
Timberlane's suit explaining that the act of state doctrine barred any
examination of the Honduran government's acts.'u The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, noting that the act of state doctrine was inapplicable as there was nothing in the suit to challenge the
sovereignty of Honduras nor to implicate its relations with the United
States government.1" Judge Choy, writing for the Ninth Circuit, found
no bar to the assertion of extraterritoral jurisdiction. 30 The court considered, however, the limitations inherent in the assertion of effectsbased jurisdiction. The court stated:

[t]hat American law covers some conduct beyond
this nation's borders does not mean that it em[Ilt is evident that at some point
braces all ....
the interests of the United States are too weak
and the foreign harmony incentive for restraint
too strong to justify an extraterritorial assertion
of jurisdiction.''
Judge Choy noted that the effects test taken by itself failed to
124. Note, American Adjudication of TransnationalSecurities Fraud,89 HARv.
L. Rav. 553, 563 (1976), which state
Although the courts have spoken in the terms of the Restatement and of Congressional policy, findings that an American
effect was direct, substantial, and foreseeable, or within the
scope of Congressional intent, have little independent significance. Instead, cases appear to turn on a reconciliation of
American and Foreign interests in regulating their respective
economies and business affairs.
quoted in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 611 (9th Cir. 1977).
125. See Note, supra note 124.
126. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1977).
127. Id. at 604-05.
128 Id. at 601.
129. Id. at 608.
130. Id. at 615.
131. Id. at 609.
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consider either the interests of other nations or the interests of the
American government.182 He then went on to formulate a jurisdictional
"rule of reason" consisting of a "tripartite analysis" with which to consider the appropriateness of the assertion of effects-based jurisdiction.123 Judge Choy reasoned that,
[T]he anti-trust laws require . . . first . . . that
there be some effect-actual or intended-on
American foreign commerce before the federal
courts may legitimately exercise subject matter
jurisdiction ....
Second, a greater showing of
burden or restraint may be necessary to demonstrate that the effect is sufficiently large to present a cognizable injury to the plaintiffs and,
therefore, a civil violation of the antitrust laws
....
Third, there is the additional question
which is unique to the international setting of
whether the interests of, and links to, the United
States-including the magnitude of the effect on
American foreign commerce-are sufficiently
strong, vis-a-vis those of other nations, to justify
an assertion of extraterritorial authority.' "
The Ninth Circuit thus sought to revitalize conflict of laws considerations relevant to the contemplated assertion of extraterritorial
jurisdiction for antitrust statutes. The court added that comity and a
conflict of laws approach to jursdiction required a consideration of
the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy,
the nationality or allegiance of the parties and the
locations or principal places of business of corporations, the extent to which enforcement by either
state can be expected to achieve compliance, the
relative significance of effects on the United
States as compared with those elsewhere, the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or
affect American commerce, the foreseeability of
such effect, and the relative importance to the violations charged of conduct within the United
States as compared with conduct abroad."
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 611-12.
Id. at 613.
Id.
Id. at 614.
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In its application of these principles to the suit before it, the
Ninth Circuit found no indication that there was any conflict between
the assertion by American courts of extraterritorial jurisdiction and
Honduran law and policy."

C.

CoMrrY AND JUDIcIA

ABSTENTION

In his Timberlane decision, Judge Choy noted that any assessment of the significance of the contacts of various nations with regard
to a particular controversy, required that reviewing courts distinguish
between a line of inquiry that the act of state doctrine prohibits and an
inquiry which balances the interest of competing states. Judge Choy
explained:
[T]here is an important distinction between examining the validity of the "public interests"
which are involved in a sovereign policy decision
amounting to an "act of state" and evaluating the
relative "interests" which each state may have "in
providing the means of adjudicating disputes or
claims that arise within its territory." Our "jurisdictional rule of reason" does not in any way require the court to question the "validity" of "foreign law or policy." Rather, the legitimacy of each
nation's interests is assumed. It is merely the relative involvement and concern of each state with
the suit at hand that is to be evaluated in determining whether extraterritorial jurisdiction
should be exercised by American courts as a matter of comity and fairness. '
136. Id. at 615. The court then remanded the case for further consideration in
light of the decision. Id.
137. Id. at 615 n.34 (quotingfrom REsTATmNT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THa UNITE STATEs § 41 comment d (1965)); accord, address by John H.
Shenefield, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, before the American Bar Association's Section of International Law (Aug. 9, 1978), reprinted in (19791 5 TADE REa.

RE'. (CCH) 1 50, 386. Shenefield states:
It is important to emphasize that [Judge] Choy did not require the courts to balance the interest of the United States
parties against those of the other nations involved. What he
required was that the interests of the United States in prose-

cuting the violations be measured both quantitatively and
qualitatively against the potential damage to United States
foreign relations generally that might result.

Id. (emphasis added).
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In considering the extraterritorial reach of the antitrust laws, the
principle of objective territoriality may be understood to be a necessary, but possibly insufficient condition to trigger an American court's
jurisdictional powers.'" Thus, in the extraterritorial context, the national interest in protecting fundamental economic policies may not be
allowed to obscure the overriding policies that characterize the developing legal relations between sovereign states.'8 Deference to the
objectives of international law and the laws of other nations must be
observed in order to secure stability in the international arena. Justice
Jackson has observed:
International Law . . . does not seek uniformity
and does not purport to restrict any nation from
making and altering its laws to govern its own
shipping and territory. However, it aims at stability and order through usages which considerations
of comity, reciprocity and long-range interest
have developed to define the domain which each
nation will claim as its own . . . But in dealing
with international commerce we cannot be unmindful of the necessity for mutual forbearance if
retaliations are to be avoided; nor should we forget that any contact which we hold sufficient to
warrant application of our law to a foreign transaction will logically be as strong a warrant for a
foreign country to apply its law to an American
transaction. 1"
To disregard the principle of comity in the extraterritorial application of American antitrust laws is to ignore the potential benefits
that lie in encouraging reciprocity of treatment in the arenas of foreign
trade policy and judicial redress."" Similarly, the disregard of the policy interests of other nations invites retaliatory legislation 142
and the
erection of divisive barriers in the international legal process.
138. 549 F.2d at 608-09.
139. Id.
140.

Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 582 (1953); see also M. McDOUGAL, H.

LAsswvLu & 1. VLAsic, LAw AND Pusuc OiwzR M SPACE 647 (1963).
141.

It has been pointed out, that in reexamining the extraterritorial application

of American antitrust laws, increased attention should be paid to the objective of obtaining foreign acceptance of antitrust judgments so as to develop the policy of "full
faith and credit" for adjudicatory proceedings within a global economy. See S. 1010
Hearings, supra note 16, at 120 (remarks of Mark Joelson).
142. See, e.g., In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, 563
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The principle of comity'14 has been embraced by Justice Department officials as an "objective standard" that permits courts in foreign
antitrust cases "to raise essential questions previously left to the politi-

cal process or ignored altogether."1' 4' In Timberlane, however, the comity analysis 14 is but part of the ad hoc decision making process carried

out by the courts. In balancing the relative interests underlying this
concept and the interests of other nations in a given controversy, questions concerning national trade policy, diplomacy, balance of payments, economic analysis and national priorities may compete for the
court's attention. The competence of the courts to handle such diverse
and complex issues has been questioned," 6 and the need for legislative
agreements to clarify America's enforceguidelines and international
14 7
ment interests is clear.
F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1977) wherein the court sustained a comity rationale for nonproduction of discovery requests where those requests would have violated Canadian law and
interfered with Canada's national interests. The enactments of blocking statutes by several foreign nations to bring to a halt unwelcomed American discovery proceedings
within their own territories presents a striking example of shortsightedness on the parts
of American courts and enforcement agents and equally shortsighted retaliatory behavior
on the parts of the foreign states. See Britain's Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980,
c. 11, Halsbury's Statutes of England 2. Current Statutes Service 305 (1980). ('Current
Law' Statutes Ann. 1980, pt. 2 c.11). Australia, Canada, The Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, South Africa and the United Kingdom have blocking statutes on
their books. See B. HAWK, supra note 96, at 318-19 (1979). The inhibiting effect of such
reactions on global economic and legal processes would seem to indicate that the problem will ultimately be resolved through bilateral agreements or treaties. Id.
143. The Timberlane comity rationale has been adopted in Mannington Mills,
Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297 (3d Cir. 1979) as well as in Dominicus
Americana Bohio v. Gulf & Western Indus., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 680, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
But see In Re Uranimum Antitrust Litigation, 1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 163,183 at
77,895 (7th Cir. 1980) in which the court held that considerations of the effects of challenged conduct, as well as the consideration of comity and fairness as guidelines to the
exercise of jurisdiction, lay within the firm discretion of the trial judge and therefore
could not be overturned in the absence of a finding of an abuse of discretion. In that
particular controversy, the decision of the trial judge to exercise jurisdiction was upheld
on the basis of his findings concerning the complexity of the litigation, the seriousness of
the charges, and the recalcitrance of the offending parties. The Seventh Circuit's affirmance has been sharply criticized for permitting such a superficial accounting of the interests of the foreign states. See Blechman, Antitrust Jurisdiction,Discovery and Enforcement in the InternationalSphere, 49 ANTrausT L.J. 1197, 1200-04 (1980).
144. Address by John Shenefield, supra note 137, at 55, 856-57.
145. 549 F.2d at 613.
146. See S.1010 Hearings, supra note 16.
147. See the prepared statement of John Shenefield, S. 1010 Hearings, supra
note 16, at 46; Testimony of William F. Kennedy, id. at 70;, prepared statement of Professor James Rahl, id. at 102-03.
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D. THE AcT oF STATE DocTrNz AND THE SHIELDING OF ANTiCOMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR

The extent to which sovereign states validate, coerce, or implement particular types of trade activity necessarily affects the amount
of deference that American courts will accord to challenged behavior in
the international marketplace."
The act of state doctrine expresses the principle that,
Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign state, and
the courts of one country will not sit in judgment
of the acts of the government of another done
within its own territory. Redress of grievances by
reason of such acts must be obtained through the
means open to be availed of sovereign powers as
between themselves."'
The policies behind the act of state doctrine have been subject to
conflicting interpretations. In Banco Nacionalde Cuba v. Sabbatino,'s
Justice Harlan grounded the doctrine in a -eparation of powers analysis which required that the Court defer to the political powers held in
the Executive branch, rather than pass on the validity or invalidity of a
foreign act of state."1 It has been noted, however, that any mechanical
application of the doctrine to deny judicial involvement in controversies would be an "abdication of the judiciary's responsibility."'" Other
writers have argued that the act of state doctrine better serves the objective of stability in the community of nations if interpreted on conflict of laws principles' 3 that require the courts to weigh the policies of
competing states against the facts of a given controversy.' "
148. See Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
149. Id. at 252.
150. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
151. Id. The Court held that the expropriation by the Cuban government of assets belonging to a private corporation could not be questioned by American courts even
though the expropriation was alleged to have violated both Cuban and international
laws.
152. First Natl City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 775 (1972)
(Powell, J., concurring). See also Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d
597 (9th Cir. 1977). "[lit is apparent that the (act of state] doctrine does not bestow a
blank check immunity upon all conduct blessed with some imprimatur of a foreign government." Id. at 606.
153. See, e.g., Leigh & Monroe, Dunhill: Toward a Reconstruction of Sabbatino,
16 VA. J. INT'L L. 685 (1976).

154.

See generally M. McDouGAL, H. LASsWzLL & I. VLAsiC, supra note 140, at
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The act of state doctrine, unlike the principle of sovereign immunity, which is available only to government entities, can be extended to
defend the actions of private litigants whose affairs are intertwined
with the sovereign. ' " It is clear, however, that an act of state defense
must be founded on more than the mere acquiescence of a sovereign to
the challenged conduct. ' "
A more difficult question concerns the applicability of the act of
state doctrine to the commercial activities of a foreign sovereign.""
While the act of state doctrine offers no "blank check immunity" for
the actions of foreign sovereigns,'" the commercial activity exception
to that doctrine compels a judicial inquiry into the nature of challenged foreign governmental activity that seems at odds with the purposes of the doctrine as formulated in Sabbatino.'" In Hunt v. Mobil
Oil Corp.,'60 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered
the claim that the Libyan government's nationalization of Hunt's oil
fields was, at least in part, a commercial act.'e ' Hunt alleged that the
expropriation his company suffered was the consequence of an illegal
combination of Persian Gulf oil interests who had conspired to injure
independent Libyan producers.'" The Court of Appeals acknowledged
the reality of the commercial activity exception to the act of state doctrine, but at the same time, seized upon the bombastic declarations of
Colonel Qaddafi and a single note from the State Department to con662.68 and sources cited therein.
155. VON KAuNowSlu, ANTmusT LAws AND TRADE RnuLAuoNs £ 5.03 (21, at 537 (1980).
156. See United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc.,
1963 Trade Cas. 1 70,600 (S.D.N.Y.), order modified 1965 Trade Cas. 1 71,352.
157. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc, v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1973).
We are in no sense compelled to recognize as an act of state
the purely commercial conduct of foreign governments in order to avoid embarassing conflicts with the Executive Branch.
. . [W]e
W fear that embarassment and conflict would more
likely ensue if we were to require that the repudiation of a
foreign government's debts arising from its operation of a
purely commercial business be recognized as an act of state
and immunized from question in our courts.
Id. at 697.98.
158. See supro note 152.
159. See supra note'151 and accompanying text. See also Occidental Petroleum
Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 110 (C.D. Cal.), afl'd per curiam 461 F.2d
1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1971). ("[ljnquiries by this court into the
authenticity and motivation of the acts of foreign sovereigns would be the very sources of
diplomatic friction and complication that the act of state doctrine aims to avert.").
160. 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977).
161. 550 F.2d at 73.
162. Id.
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and,
dude that the conduct of the Libyan government was "political"
8
1
doctrine.
state
of
act
the
under
non-justiciable
therefore,
The Hunt opinion, it is submitted, is highly unsatisfactory because of the court's unwillingness to look beyond the arguably superficial rhetoric that accompanied the Libyan expropriation. While paying
"lip service" to the commercial activities exception, the court never
permitted itself to consider the merits of the plaintiff's allegation that
the take overs were motivated by Libya's commercial interests. The
decision in Hunt illustrates the tendency of the courts to abdicate the
judicial function in deference to political issues that the Sabbatino decision has allocated to the Executive branch of the government.," The
fundamental difficulty seems to lie in the refusal by courts to look beyond activities that are merely labelled as political and to consider the
actual substance of the challenged act.
Other decisions have established that certain types of sovereign
activity do not rise to the level of an act of state. 68 In Outboard
Marine Corp. v. Pezetel'" an action was brought challenging the sale
of low-priced Polish golf carts within the United States." 7 The U.S.
District Court of Delaware found that as the sale of the carts in no way
implicated Polish political processes or that nation's sovereignty, the
act of state doctrine was inapplicable. '
The characteristic problem for the courts in reviewing act of state
defenses is the determination as to when government acts take on the
essential attributes of sovereign acts. There is little doubt, however,
that private companies can effectively shield otherwise prohibited conduct under the act of state doctrine by soliciting or lobbying for anticompetitive legislation within the foreign state. Thus, in American
Bananal" the Supreme Court stated: "[I]t is a contradiction in terms
to say that within its jurisdiction it is unlawful to persuade a sovereign
power to bring about a result that it declares by its conduct to be deand proper . . . It makes the persuasion lawful by its own
sirable
''
act.

9170

The Supreme Court's reasoning in American Banana was held to
163. Id.
164. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 430-34 (1964) (Harlan,

J.).

165. See VON KALNowsiu, supra note 155, at 5-35.
166. 461 F. Supp. 384 (D. Del. 1978). See also Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1293 (3d Cir. 1979) (mere issuance of patents by foreign
power does not constitute an act of state).
167. 461 F. Supp. 384.
168. Id. at 409-10.
169. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
170. Id. at 358.
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be controlling in Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil
Co.," 1 where the defendant companies were charged with inducing foreign sovereigns to claim title to the plaintiff's oil concession."' The
Buttes court barred the action as a claim for injuries flowing from the
acts of the sovereign.

17

3

The inducement of anticompetitive legislation is also shielded by
the Noerr-Pennington17"' doctrine which protects lobbying efforts from
antitrust liability on the basis of the consititutional right to petition."'

Although the applicability of the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine to foreign
litigants is uncertain, the Justice Department has nevertheless accepted the validity of the theory in its Antitrust Guide for International Operations.'"

E.

FOREIGN SOVEREIGN COMULSION

A circumstance raising antitrust issues of a different character occurs when a private business entity is compelled to conduct its operations within a foreign sovereign's territory in a manner that is violative
of American laws. In such situations there is no question of collusive or
conspiratorial activity on the part of the defendant company,"' nor
can American courts demand that a foreign sovereign comply with
American laws."' Unlike the act of state doctrine which focuses primarily on the appropriate response of courts to the contested acts of a
sovereign government,"' the notion of foreign sovereign compulsion requires that courts be guided by a policy of fairness toward a defendant
171. Supra note 159.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 110. See also supra note 167.
174. See Eastern R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365
U.S. 127 (1961); see also UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
175. 365 U.S. at 137-38.
176. Supra note 122.
177. The foreign sovereign compulsion defense offers no immunity for trade activities that are merely permitted by the foreign sovereign (Continental Ore Co. v. Union
Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962)) or where the defendant company has deliberately acted to bring about discriminatory legislation in a foreign state (United States
v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927)).
178. See, e.g., United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center,
Inc., supra note 156. The court stated: "If, of course, the defendants' activities had been
required by Swiss law, this court could indeed do nothing. An American court would
have under such circumstances no right to condemn the governmental activity of another
sovereign nation." Id. at 77.
179. See Sabbatino, supra note 164.
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that is caught between the laws of two or more nations.'"
In Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc.,"'
the Venezuelan Government forbade its oil concessionaires to ship oil
to Interamerican, an oil exporting firm located in New Jersey. 1 " Because Interamerican was an exporter it could operate without being
subject to import quotas or tariff restrictions'" and was, therefore, able
to offer Venezuelan oil to world markets at less than posted prices '."
The effect of the Venezuelan Government's order to its concessionaires
was to launch a boycott against Interamerican by depriving that company of any oil suppliers.16 5 Interamerican then brought an action
against the Venezuelan suppliers charging that a refusal to deal consitituted a violation of antitrust laws.'" The defendants, in building their
case, raised the defense of foreign sovereign compulsion and the court
agreed, stating:
It requires no precedent, however, to acknowledge
that sovereignty includes the right to regulate
commerce within the nation. When a nation compels a trade practice, firms there have no choice
but to obey .... Anticompetitive practices compelled by foreign nations are not restraints of
commerce, as commerce is understood in the
Sherman Act, because refusal to comply would
put an end to commerce. (citation omitted). . .Commerce may exist at the will of the
government, and to impose liability for obedience
to that will would eliminate for many companies
the ability to transact business in foreign lands." 7
It is clear that the crucial question for courts in reviewing a sovereign compulsion defence "is whether the challenged anticompetitive
conduct was in fact compelled .... Mere acquiescence, approval or
delegation of authority [by a foreign sovereign] is not sufficient."'" It
seems that the most relevant inquiry into the substance of the foreign
compulsion defense would focus on the effective powers of those who
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

See B. HAWK, supra note 96, at 151.
307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1298.
B. HAWK, supra note 96, at 152-53.
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would compel a company to act in a particular way. It would be unrealistic to assume that foreign compulsion can always by indentified by
virtue of the presence of official legal practices. Furthermore, any inquiry into the validity or legality of challenged sovereign actions would
most likely run afoul of the act of state doctrine.'"
An extensive analysis of the repercussions of foreign compulsion
on American interests was conducted by the Justice Department in the
suit against the Bechtel Corporation for its compliance with the "Arab
boycott" of American firms that dealt with Israel.'" The pragmatic solution of the consent decree entered in Bechtel permitted that company to engage in business with the foreign instigators of the boycott
but prohibited Bechtel from participation in the boycott selection process or in any conduct that directly injured United States persons."''
The decree sought to reemphasize the distinction between attempting
to regulate the conduct of American nationals abroad whose activities
could not be said to have an impact on American commerce, or its citizens, and the prosecution of those entities who actively participated in
furthering foreign schemes to injure American interests.'" Thus, Bechtel was permitted to comply with the Arab League's boycott, but was
not permitted to further it in any way.".*

F. THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES AcT OF 1976
Unlike the act of state doctrine, which is available to any party in
a proceeding, ' " the privilege of immunity contained in the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 [FSIA]"' s may be invoked only by
the sovereign itself.11" The FSIA differs further from the act of state
doctrine in its creation of a statutory exception to the grant of immunity for the sovereign's participation in commercial activity which has
189.

See, e.g., 307 F. Supp. at 1298-99.'

190. United States v. Bechtel Corp., (1979-1) Trade Cas. 1 62,429 (N.D. Cal.
1979) (consent decree); id. at 1 62,430 (opinion); see especially the Justice Department's
statement in support of the proposed Bechtel consent decree in 43 Fed. Reg. 12,657-64
(1978), reprinted in B. HAWK, supra note 96, at 156-65.
191. Id. at 158-59.
192. Id.

193. Id.
194.

See VON KAUNOWSKI, supra note 155, at 5-37.

195. Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)(a)(4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1976)).
196. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 states: "(A) foreign state shall be immune from the juris-

diction of the courts of the United States and of the States except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter."
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a direct effect on American commerce.1' Pursuant to Section 1606 of
the FSIA, litigants may sue the sovereign itself for only the actual
damages that have been suffered, 1' " however, the litigant may subject
state instrumentalities" or state owned corporations, to the treble
damage claims that are allowed in private antitrust actions. 2°"
The function of the FSIA may be best understood as a response
to the expanding activities and roles of foreign governments in trade
activity that characterized the international marketplace in the years
following World War HI.2" During that period, it became evident that
extensive participation by foreign states was inconsistent with a blanket grant of immunity to the wide variety of activities carried on by
sovereign entities.202
In 1952, Jack B. Tate, then the Acting Legal Advisor of the State
Department, sent a letter to the Justice Department which was to become famous because of its important clarification of the policies which
should guide the United States Government in responding to the competing interests of foreign states and private parties who sought to
enter the international marketplace. 03 Mr. Tate wrote:
The Department of State has for some time had
under consideration the question whether the
practice of the Government in granting immunity
from suit to foreign governments without their
consent should not be changed. . . According to
the newer or restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized
with regard to sovereign or public acts (jure imperil) of a state, but not with respect to private
acts (jure gestionis)...
. ..[T]he Department feels that the widespread and increasing practice on the part of governments of engaging in commercial activities
makes necessary a practice which will enable persons doing business with them to have their rights
determined in the courts. For these reasons it will
hereafter be the Department's policy to follow the
197.

28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976).

198. Id. § 1606.
199. Id. § 1603(a)-(b).
200. Id.
201. See Rabinowitz, Can the Courts Cope with the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act?, 1 N.Y.J. INT'L & ComP. L. 130 (1980).
202. Id. at 132-33.

203.

Id.
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restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in consideration of the requests of foreign governments
for a grant of sovereign immunity.
It is realized that a shift in policy by the Executive cannot control the courts but it is felt that
the courts are less likely to allow a plea of sovereign immunity where the Executive has declined
to do so ...
The fundamental issues raised by the "Tate" letter were explicitly recalled twenty-four years later when the House Judiciary Committee
expressed one of the principal aims of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. 2°0 The Report states:
Today, when a foreign state wishes to assert immunity, it will often request the Department of
State to make a formal suggestion of immunity to
the court. Although the State Department espouses the restrictive principle of immunity, the
foreign state may attempt to bring diplomatic influences to bear upon the State Department's determination. A principle purpose of this bill is to
transfer the determination of sovereign immunity
from the Executive branch to the Judicial branch,
thereby reducing the foreign policy implications
of immunity determinations and assuring litigants
that these often crucial decisions are made on
purely legal grounds and under procedures that
ensure due process.

2

"

The House Report unambiguously sets forth the objective of depoliticizing claims arising from the participation of foreign sovereigns
in international commercial activities.' ° By de-emphasizing the poten-

tial role for intervention by the Chief Executive or the State Department 2°8 in commercial disputes, the FSIA contributes to the development of predictable and orderly trade relations among actors in the
international marketplace by protecting, and therefore encouraging,
STATE BuLL. 984 (1952), reprinted in H. STmNm & D. VAGTS,
LEGAL PROBLEMS 647 (2d ed. 1976).
205. H.R. Rep. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in [19761 U.S. CODs
CONG. & AD. NEWs 6604, 6605-06.

204.

26 DP'T

TRANsNATIONAL

206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
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the reasonable commercial expectations of participants in the trade
process. The FSIA's allocation of competence to the judiciary to scrutinize a foreign sovereign's commercial activity is designed to encourage
widespread participation in the legal process and foster the expectation
that disputes will be settled in a principled or legal manner, as distinct
from dispute resolution that is subject to the vagaries that may attend
decision making in politically guided institutions.3 "9
Judicial competence to hear claims against foreign sovereigns
arising under the FSIA is predicated upon familiar jurisdictional principles.2" ° Jurisdiction may be founded upon the sovereign's consent to
subject itself to the laws of United States courts.'11 Such consent may
be inferred from prior treaties in which the sovereign has consented to
waive its immunity or consent may be recognized on the basis of particular contractual provisions in which the sovereign has agreed to be
bound by a foreign law.' 1 2 In addition, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act incorporates both territorial and effects-based jurisdictional
principles to reach foreign-based commercial activity conducted within
the United States, as well as foreign-based activity that "causes a direct effect in the United States."'1 s
209. McDougal & Jasper, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Some
Suggested Amendments, in PiUVATS ]NVESToRs ABROAD 6-12 (Southwestern Legal Foundation ed. 1981).

210. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (a) (1).
28 U.S.C. § 1605 (a) (1) states(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction
of courts of the United States or of the States in any
case(1) in which the foreign state has waived its immunity either
explicitly or by implication, notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver which the foreign state may purport
to effect except in accordance with the terms of the
waiver...
212. See Ipitrade International S.A. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 465 F. Supp.
824 (D.D.C. 1978) (District court enforced Swiss arbitration award against Nigeria on the
basis of Nigeria's contractual agreement to be bound by Swiss arbitration.); see also Libyan American Oil Co. v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 482 F. Supp. 1175
(D.D.C. 1980) (Libya's agreement to arbitration in contract constituted a waiver of immunity); but see Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 488 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) (foreign sovereign's waiver of immunity before the courts of another sovereign did
not necessarily constitute a waiver of immunity before American courts).
213. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (a) (2) (1976) states:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction
of courts of the United States or of the States in any
case(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity
carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or
211.
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The key inquiry for the purposes of suit under the FSIA is
whether the challenged conduct of the foreign state is fundamental to
a governmental
purpose or whether it is merely a commercial activity.214 Section 1603(d) of the FSIA provides:
A "commercial activity" means either a regular
course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act. The commerical character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or
particular transaction 2 or
act, rather than by ref1
erence to its purpose.
By directing judicial attention toward "the nature" of a foreign
sovereign's activities, instead of toward the possible governmental purposes that might have motivated a government to engage in a particular activity, Congress created an objective test for courts to follow that
minimizes the possibility of extending the grant of immunity beyond
210
the most fundamental of government acts and processes.
upon an act performed in the United States in connec-

tion with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United
States in connection with a commercial activity of the
foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect
in the United States ....
214.

Consider In re Investigation of World Arrangements, 13 F.R.D. 280, 290

(D.D.C. 1952). The English government's control of the Anglo-Iranian oil corporation for
the purpose of supplying oil to the British Navy was held to be a governmental function
to which immunity might attach. In United States v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft, 31 F.2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1929), service to the corporate defendant was upheld even
though controlled by the French government for the reason that French law permitted
suit against the corporation.
215. 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (d) (1976) (emphasis added).
216. H. R. Rep. No. 11,487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1976). In an elaboration on
the point raised here, Judge Choy has written:
The purpose test, which asks whether the act in question was
undertaken for sovereign ends, is subjective. The nature test,
which focuses on the nature of the act itself is objective. The
purpose test grants broader immunity, since even the most
commercial activity could have an underlying governmental
purpose.... The problem with the purpose test is that the
expectations of the . . . seller relying on the commercial ap-

pearance of the activity would be frustrated if the foreign government could claim immunity and disclaim its obligation to
pay. Only the objective test would protect the seller's reliance
on the commercial appearance of the purchase as commercial
activity subject to domestic laws.
Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Organization of the Petroleum Export-
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The FSIA test for "commercial activity" has functioned to produce clearcut findings of sovereign liability in a number of cases. In
Texas Trading v. Federal Republic of Nigeria and Central Bank of
17
Nigeria2
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit easily disposed
of Nigeria's claim for sovereign immunity in litigation arising out of
that country's repudiation of letters of credit involving massive
purchases of concrete.21' Judge Kaufman stated, "Nigeria's activity
here is in the nature of a private contract for the purchase of goods. Its
purpose-to build roads, army barracks, whatever-is irrelevant."'2'
The distinction between commercial and governmental activity,
although narrowly defined in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,
can virtually dissolve, however, when the commercial activity centers
around a politically volatile commodity such as oil.2 0 In International
Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries"21 the labor union (IAM) filed suit
against the members of OPEC alleging that their price-fixing activities
violated America's antitrust laws. Judge Hauk, writing for the district
court, reasoned that in as much as the control of natural resources has
been recognized under international law principles to be a prime government function,"' the disposition of those resources could be recognized to stem "from the nature of sovereignty.""'
Judge Hauk explained further that:
The defendants' control over their oil resources is
an especially sovereign function because oil, as
their primary, if not sole, revenue producing resource, is crucial to the welfare of their nations'
peoples. . . . [T]here can be little question that
establishing the terms and conditions for removal
of natural resources from its territory, when done
by a sovereign state individually and separately,
is a governmental activity.'"
ing Countries, 649 F.2d 1354, 1357 n.6 (9th Cir. 1981) [hereinafter cited as IAM v.

OPEC].
217. 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981). See also IAM v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. 553 (C.D.
Cal. 1979); Perez v. Bahamaz, 482 F. Supp. 1208 (D.D.C. 1980).
218. 647 F.2d at 300.
219. Id. at 310.
220. Id.
221. 477 F. Supp. 553 (C.D. Cal. 1979), affd on other grounds, 649 F.2d 1354
(9th Cir. 1981).
222. 477 F. Supp. at 567.
223. Id. at 567-68.
224. Id. at 568.
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The effect of the district court's decision in IAM v. OPEC was to
place the activities of certain state trading cartels beyond the purview
of American courts. It appears safe to assume that Judge Hauk did not
intend to immunize all types of foreign sovereign commodity activity
involving their natural resources, as such a decision would clearly be at
odds with the restrictive approach to immunizing sovereign activity
that is contained in the FSIA.225
IAM subsequently argued on appeal that the district court had
erred by making reference to the sovereign purposes that could be used
to explain OPEC's price-fixing activities .2' IAM reasoned that as their
complaint had specifically been framed with reference to price-fixing, it
was improper for the district court to have looked beyond that activity
in order to support a grant of immunity pursuant to the FSIA.22
Judge Choy, writing for the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, agreed with IAM's reasoning, but went on to deny entirely the
applicability of the FSIA to OPEC's activities.2 6 Judge Choy then resorted to the act of state doctrine to extricate the court from the narrow frame of reference required by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act for a consideration of the challenged conduct of OPEC.'2"
Judge Choy reasoned that the price-fixing activity of OPEC included a significant sovereign component which required that the court
look beyond the question of price-fixing to consider the sovereign's
motivations,' 30 thus raising an act of state issue. Judge Choy then
stated: "When the state qua state acts in the public interest, its sovereignty is asserted."''
The focal question is whether Judge Choy's analysis preserves the
distinction between sovereign and commercial acts by governments.
The discovery of a "significant sovereign component" should not be
considered apart from the whole sequence of events that comprise the
challenged activity, for even the most blatantly commercial activity
225. Judge Hauk's decision can be further criticized for failing to set forth adequate guidelines for distinquishing "Opec-type" state trading activities from lesser types
of governmental involvement in commercial arenas. The "sole natural resource" analysis

carried out by the District Court created an immunity within the FSIA that could apply
to much of the world's trading activity. See Note, IAM v. OPEC: Political Question or
Commercial Activity, 1 N.Y.J. IWr'L & CoMp. L. 173 (1980).

226. 1AM v. OPEC, 649 F.2d at 1358.
227. Id. at 1358-59.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Judge Choy wrote: "The Act of State Doctrine is apposite whenever the
federal courts must question the legality of the sovereign acts of foreign states." Id. at
1359.
231. Id. at 1360.
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carried on by a sovereign might then fall into such an exception. The
immunization of commercial activity on such grounds is clearly at odds
2
with the legislative history of the FSIA. 32
A reader might possibly infer from Judge Choy's reasoning in the
IAM v. OPEC case that the price-fixing activities of the OPEC members were so interrelated with the sovereign acts of those nations that
no viable distinction between sovereignty and commercial activity
could by made by the court. Such an approach, however, produces a
judicial blurring of the distinction between acts jure imperii and acts
jure gestionis. The Ninth Circuit's opinion in IAM v. OPEC demonstrates that the inevitable result of a fusing of the two concepts is a
demise of the commercial activity exception in favor of a highly
politicized world marketplace.
Controversies such as IAM's suit against OPEC may, in fact, raise
issues that are beyond the competence of the courts, but it is no solution to that dilemma to permit the immunity principle embodied in
the act of state doctrine to undermine the restrictive immunity principle of the FSIA and the policy of commercial predictability that it fosters. The two doctrines should operate in a parallel fashion so as not to
defeat each other. A more appropriate ground for judicial withdrawal
from a particular controversy might be found by resort to the political
232. Judge Choy found that the FSIA had in no way superseded or limited judicial recourse to the act of state doctrine. 649 F.2d at 1359. But a fair reading of the
House Judiciary Report, which accompanied H.R. 11315, might well produce a different
impression. It was noted there that:
The committee has been advised that in some cases, after the
defense of sovereign immunity has been denied or removed as
an issue, the art [sic]
of state doctrine may be improperly asserted to block litigation.... The committee has found it unnecessary to address the act of state doctrine since decisions
such as that in the DunhiU case (425 U.S. 682) demonstrate
that our courts already have considerable guidance enabling
them to reject improper assertions of the act of state doctrine .... The conclusions of the Committee are in concurrence with the position of the government in its amicus brief
to the Supreme Court in the Dunhill case where the Solicitor
General states: "Under the modern restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, a foreign state is not immune from suit on its
commercial obligations. To elevate the foreign state's commercial acts to the protected status of 'acts of state' would frustrate this modern development by permitting sovereign immunity to reenter through the back door, under the guise of the
act of state doctrine. (Amicus Brief of the United States, p.
41)."
H.R. Rap. No. 94-1487,94th Cong., 2d Sass. 20 n.1, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMm. Nzws 6619 n.1.
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question doctrine. While this response may also reflect judicial deference toward the separation of powers, it can serve to turn the focus of
inquiry away from an unprincipled conjectural analysis about the
needs a branch of the government might have for latitude and freedom
from judicial interference and redirect judicial analysis toward the appraisal of a controversy in light of the adequacy of existing enactments,
legal principles, and ongoing trends of decision concerning
the alloca3s
tion of authority within governmental institutions.

V.

CONCLUSION

It would be unrealistic to expect the simplistic formula offered in
Section 1603(d) of the FSIA to crystallize for all time a distinction between sovereign acts and commercial activity. Sovereignty and commerce are concepts that are determined by a broad range of changing
conditions. 34 The nature of sovereign authority or acts jure imperii is
not fixed. 335 Similarly, commercial contexts are subject to extensive

changes.'" Free markets may become regulated markets; natural monopolies may evolve through technological advances to become competitive. Environmental conditions may impose limitations on the freedom of actors to exploit a particular commodity. The application of
antitrust laws to the international marketplace requires, as does the
FSIA, both a judicial sensitivity toward the profound changes that can
affect the very character of the marketplace, and the vision to work
toward principled outcomes that serve to clarify and foster shared ex233. See, e.g., the Supreme Court's decision in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962), wherein Justice Brennan stated:
There are sweeping statements to the effect that all questions
touching foreign relations are political questions. .

.

. Yet it is

error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches
foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance. Our cases in
this field seem invariably to show a discriminating analysis of
the particular question posed, in terms of the history of its
management by the political branches, of its susceptibility to
judicial handling in the light of its nature and posture in the
specific case, and of the possible consequences of judicial
action.
Id. at 211-12.
234. See notes 235 and 236 infra.
235. Cf. IAM v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. 553 (9th Cir. 1981)(similar holding).
236. See generally United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d
Cir. 1945).
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pectations about the efficacy of the global market and the international

system.
Geoffrey Swaebe

